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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
Prior to 1957, Section 15 (now Section 375) of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law made, without qualification, the failure to signal before turning a traffic
infraction.73 However, the Legislature, cognizant of the many instances when
such act was insignificant, amended Section 15 through the enactment of
Section 1163.
In People v. Lyons," defendant maintained the evidence was insufficient
as a matter of law to show his failure affected other traffic. The Court said
that testimony of a policeman that other vehicles were within 700 feet of the
rear of defendant's car, and defendant's own admission that there was traffic
coming into the street, was sufficient to find that other traffic ould be affected
by the lack of a turn signal. In justifying its decision, the Court pointed to
the mounting highway fatality toll as demanding a tight application of "these
75
simple, easy-to-obey traffic rules.1

HomosXUAL PRoPosA

CONSTITUTES VAGRANCY

The defendant in People v. Hale76 was arrested for making a homosexual
proposal to a police officer in a bus terminal. A conviction was obtained for
vagrancy under Section 887(4) cls. (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. 77 The Supreme Court, Erie County, reversed, holding that the defendant's conduct did not constitute vagrancy, but rather that he should have
been proceeded against for disorderly conduct under Section 722(8) of the
Penal Law. 78 The Court of Appeals held that cl. (b) of Section 887(4) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure was restricted in application to those who
solicit on behalf of third parties, e.g. "pimps,"7 9 but that cl. (c) did include
this type of activity, and reversed the Supreme Court's dismissal.
It appears that the defendant's conduct is covered by the disorderly conduct,80 as well as the vagrancy statute, and that this is an unavoidable result
appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided in the event any other traffic
may be affected by such movement.
73. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 15(18) (now Section 375):
it shall also be unlawful to fail to cause such signals to be maintained at
all times, in good and sufficient working order, or to fail to use the same when
making or preparing to make any stop or turn....
74. 7 N.Y.2d 36, 194 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1959).
75. Id. at 37, 194 N.Y.S.2d 493.
76. 8 N.Y.2d 162, 203 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1960).
77. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 887:
The following persons are vagrants: ... (4.) (a) person . .. (b) who offers or
offers to secure another for the purpose of prostitution, or for any other lewd
or indecent act, or (c) who loiters in or near any thoroughfare or public or private
place for the purpose of inducing, inticing or procuring another to commit lewdness, fornication, unlawful sexual intercourse or any other indecent act.
78. N.Y. Penal Law § 722:
Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a
breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the following acts shall
be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct: ... (8.) Frequents
or loiters about any public place soliciting men for the purpose of committing
a crime against nature or other lewdness.
79. People v. Gould, 306 N.Y. 352, 118 N.E. 553 (1954).
80. Supra note 77; See People v. Lopez, 7 N.Y.2d 825, 196 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1959);
People v. Liebenthal, 5 N.Y.2d 876, 182 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1959). -
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in a criminal system such as New York's. When nothing constitutes a crime
unless it is so designated by statute, 8 ' the Legislature in attempting to cover
all areas of prospective criminal activity will of necessity overlap areas in order
to avoid creating loopholes. Thus situations will arise, as in the present case,
where the defendant's activity is covered by two different sections. 82 Had the
Court of Appeals decided conversely we would have the anomalous result of
the defendant picking, in these areas of overlap, the section under which he
preferred to be charged. This would undoubtedly be the more difficult under
which to obtain a conviction and would consequently seem out of line with
the accusatory process. The Court of Appeals might have also been influenced
by the possibility of a requirement of showing a breach of the peace in order
to obtain a conviction for disorderly conduct,88 and perhaps did not wish to
impose this formidable burden on the prosecutor.
CHARGE TO JURy CONCERNING SECOND DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER

The seventeen year old defendant fatally stabbed another youth with a
paring knife in a pool hall fracas. In People v. Drislane,8 4 his conviction of
first degree manslaughter which was affirmed by the Appellate Division,85 was
reversed by the Court of Appeals.
The instructions of the trial court concerning the first degree were correct. 6 As to the second degree, however, the court only instructed the jury
as to Section 1052(2) of the Penal Law which reads in part: "Such homicide
is manslaughter in the second degree, when committed without design to effect
death: (2). In the heat of passion, but not by a dangerous weapon .. .". The
court failed to give any instructions under Section 1052(3), the so-called
omnibus clause, which reads in part: "By any act, pr6curement or culpable
negligence ... which, . . . does not constitute the crime of murder in the first
or second degree nor manslaughter in the first degree." The Court of Appeals
interpreted the trial court as also charging that the paring knife was a dangerous weapon.8 7
The jury became perplexed as to what constituted manslaughter in the
second degree and returned for further instructions. Prompted by the jury's
question, the court flatly charged that the second degree could not be found
where a dangerous weapon was used. Since it failed to instruct the jury concerning the omnibus clause, and since it had previously charged that this paring
81. Supra note 78.
82. People v. Florio, 301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950); People v. Hines, 284 N.Y.
93, 29 N.E.2d 483 (1940); People v. Bord, 243 N.Y. 595, 154 N.E. 620 (1926).
83. People v. Evans, - Misc. -, 192 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1959).
84. 8 N.Y2d 67, 201 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1960).
85.

9 A.D.2d 932, 196 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Dep't 1959).

86. N.Y. Penal Law § 1050.
87. A search of the Record on Appeal does not dearly establish that the Trial Court
instructed the jury that the knife was a dangerous weapon, although the instructions could
be read with that interpretation.

